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This  article opens  the black box of the remote controlled traffic light system used by public transport in Brussels. This technical 
device redistributes the temporal sharing of space in favour of public transport, which allows the constant erosion of the 
commercial speed faced by the Société de transports intercommunaux de Bruxelles  (STIB) to be halted, thus  cutting back on 
operational costs. Our objective is to make sense of this technical device and to highlight the underlying political challenges  in 
terms  of the management of space. At the heart of 
discussions on remote controlled traffic lights is  of 
course the question of the respective role of public 
transport and cars in the context of a very high level 
of road congestion. We also wish to emphasise the 
relatively invisible work of the administration (in this 
case Bruxelles  Mobilité)  in its capacity to create 
compromises – with their advantages  and 
disadvantages – so that a  project is  able to function 
within the Brussels “ecosystem”.
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1. This  article deals  with a specific technical device: the remote 
controlled traffic light system used by public transport in Brussels. This 
device allows  a  redistribution of the temporal sharing of space, to be 
adjusted in favour of public transport.
2. Thanks to our collaboration with Bruxelles  Mobilité, the Brussels 
administration responsible for facilities  and transport, in the framework 
of its  mobility observatory, we were able to have a look “behind the 
scenes” at the implementation of this  device, as  well as  explore its 
creation and development, through administrative documents  (working 
notes, reports, meeting proceedings, technical documents, etc.) and 
the accounts  of those involved in the implementation of this  system (at 
Société des transports  intercommunaux bruxellois  - STIB  and Bruxelles 
Mobilité). In addition, we read the reports of parliamentary questions  on 
the subject, in order to understand more fully the history and the 
evolution. 
3. At the end of this research, through this  article, our first aim is to 
advocate the socialisation of technical tools. This means  that we wish 
to make sense of the remote controlled traffic lights  technical device 
and the underlying political challenges, as well as make them 
accessible to the public debate. This is  why we have entered into the 
rationale of the technical tool to try to understand the problems  which it 
is  supposed to resolve and the roles  of the different stakeholders 
regarding the questions and hypotheses it raises [Barthe, 2009]. This 
article thus  proposes to highlight the relationship between politics  (in 
the broad sense) and technical tools, in terms  of the management of 
space. 
4. Secondly, we wish to emphasise the relatively invisible work of the 
administration, its  active role and its  capacity to create compromises 
[Zitouni and Tellier, 2013], with their advantages and disadvantages, so 
that a project is able to function within the Brussels “ecosystem”.
1. Origin and context of the project 
5. The improvement of the commercial speed and the regularity of 
public transport vehicles  have constituted a major challenge for the 
Region and STIB  for more than twenty years. These concerns  are at 
the heart of the AVANTI programme (formerly VICOM), through which 
the two entities  implement various  measures  in order to deal with them. 
These solutions  – which are complementary – involve measures  related 
to infrastructure (implementation of separate lanes for certain sections 
of tram and bus lines) and behaviour, aimed at obliging other users  – 
mainly motorists – to respect public transport sites and stops via 
tickets. The third approach lies  in a time-based distribution of the use of 
the road space in favour of public transport through the management 
of traffic light cycles. 
6. The dynamic management of traffic light cycles in Brussels  is  not 
new. It began with several pilot projects  in the 1980s 1  and soon 
captured the interest of the authorities of the new Brussels Region at 
the beginning of the 1990s, in a context of excitement in Europe 
regarding the “intelligent road”2  [Lannoy, 2001]. Afterwards, different 
mechanisms  were tested until a dynamic management system (MS12) 
was  chosen in 2006, which should be applied to all of the crossroads  in 
the Region. At present, only STIB vehicles are concerned, but there are 
plans to include the other operators eventually.
1
1 A well-known precedent in Brussels is that of remote controlled traffic lights in favour of trams on Avenue Louise when they cross the slip roads accessing the tunnels.
2  “A technical and organisational concept which defines an ideal technical system in which the two main activities related to the phenomenon of road circulation are integrated via the 
intermediary of information and communication technologies: the management of traffic and driving” [Lannoy, 2001: 41].
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1.1. The MS12 system
7. A remote controlled traffic light system for public transport is  a 
technical device used to favour public transport vehicles  at crossroads 
through the shortening or lengthening of different phases  of green. The 
MS12 management method3  is a dynamic traffic light management 
system, to the extent that it adapts  the signals  according to the 
detection of a public transport vehicle arriving at a crossroads. The 
vehicle is given relative priority, i.e. priority which guarantees  a  higher 
rate of green,4  unlike total priority, which guarantees  a true 100% 
probability that when a public transport vehicle arrives  at a crossroads it 
will be able to go through, to the detriment of the rest of the traffic 
[Furth and Muller, 2000]. The choice of this  relative priority is  justified by 
the concern that certain crossroads would be blocked and that the flow 
of other types  of traffic (mainly that of cars) would be influenced too 
greatly, and also that other lines  of public transport would be penalised, 
given the dense network in Brussels [BCR parliament, 2015]. 
8. In concrete terms, a public transport vehicle with an on-board 
transmitter sends  a signal to the crossroads soon before it arrives 
(theoretical arrival time), as  well as  the details of its  path and its level of 
priority. The priority of public transport vehicles  is spread out over three 
levels  (0 = no priority, 1 = low priority or 2 = high priority) and private 
vehicles have no priority. At the crossroads, the message is received by 
a traffic controller. This  consists  of a  technical device which interprets 
the message and configures  the coming traffic light phases according 
to the rules programmed for it which are included in a series of decision 
matrices  (traffic light grids and priority matrices). This  is  of course the 
essence of traffic light management and the decision to give higher or 
lower priority to a tram or a bus. 
9. Let us  examine only the traffic light grid. This  consists of a timeline 
with a succession of traffic light phases (green and red)  at a 
crossroads, separated by the necessary time for the yellow light and 
clearing (during which all lights are red in order to allow users  enough 
time to clear the crossroads at the end of the phase). For a  crossroads 
equipped with remote controlled traffic lights, each green phase is 
divided into four stages or time periods. These are referred to as 
“MS12”, named after their chronological succession: 
• The minimum time for the green light is the time which is 
necessary in theory for a pedestrian to cross the road during the 
green phase, at a speed of 1 metre/second. There is  no priority 
which is authorised to cut down that time.
2
3 For a detailed explanation of the functioning of the MS12 system, see Brandeleer [et al. 2016].
4 Probability that the traffic light is green on arrival at the crossroads. 
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Commercial speed
In the area of public transport, 
commercial speed refers to the 
speed which is “useful to the 
user”, i.e. the average speed of 
car travel. If applicable, it 
includes the length of stops 
and other reasons for slowing 
down. It is therefore an 
indicator of the performance of 
a network, in both economic 
and qualitative terms, based 
on the average speed of the 
vehicles.
Measure of the STIB 
commercial speed
In Brussels, STIB measures 
the journey times on its 
network thanks to the data 
gathered by the operational 
support system which equips 
the vehicles. These data are 
used above all to recalculate 
periodically new times to be 
integrated into the timetables 
of each line. The calculation is 
based on a specific 
methodology whose guiding 
principle is to maximise 
punctuality. It is therefore 
based on the most typical 
days of service, excluding 
exceptional circumstances. 
Therefore, by taking all of the 
times used in the timetables, 
the planned commercial speed 
of the network is obtained. 
This is the number in the 
operator’s annual report, which 
corresponds to the situation at 
the end of the year. 
[Lebrun et al., 2012]
• The standard time for the green light is  guaranteed by 
default and is only cut by the request of a public transport 
vehicle with high priority.
• The first extension depends  on the detection of cars  or 
public transport vehicles but may be cut by a vehicle with higher 
priority (at least a low priority).
• The second extension takes  place only at the request of a 
public transport vehicle with low or high priority.
10. In practice, when a  public transport vehicle approaches, the 
phases are calculated in order to allow a  maximum window of green for 
it to go through the crossroads. In order to do this, the traffic controller 
may decide to add (first and second extension) or to cut certain phases 
(standard phase). The longer the window of green, the more likely there 
will be a 100% chance for STIB  vehicles to go through during a  green 
light. The length of the window is  limited by the maximum length 
accepted for a cycle (objective to reach a  maximum of 120 seconds 
per cycle) and the strategic importance of the crossroads  in terms  of 
car traffic. 
1.2. The advantages of the dynamic management of traffic light 
cycles
11. The arguments  in favour of remote controlled traffic lights  are 
above all technical and economic. For the user, the increase in the 
commercial speed results in shorter journey times, and the regularity 
guarantees greater punctuality, less  crowding at stops and in the 
vehicles, a decrease in situations  with “trains of vehicles” and, overall, a 
better opinion of the service provided. 
12. From the operator's point of view, it results  in lower operating 
costs: on the one hand, by improving the commercial speed, there is a 
decrease in journey time and, on the other hand, the improvement in 
regularity allows a decrease in regulation time, or waiting time, 
necessary for the time coordination of the vehicle at the terminus  before 
the next journey. In concrete terms, these gains  may ensure either the 
same frequency with less  vehicles, or an increase in the frequency with 
the same number of vehicles [STIB, 2003].
3
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Figure 1. Principle of the MS12 system. Source: internal presentation at Bruxelles Mobilité by Siemens-VSE 
during the working group on 30/05/2007.
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An example
As an example, the installation 
of the MS12 system in the 
Luxembourg – Trois Tilleuls 
section of the 95 bus line 
allows – for this section alone 
on a standard day of the week 
(Monday, Tuesday, Thursday, 
Friday, except during school 
holidays) – an averagea gain of 
0.6 minutes on the journey 
towards Trois Tilleuls and 1.9 
minutes on the journey towards  
Luxembourg. It is estimated 
that, for this type of standard 
day alone, bus 95 makes 160 
journeys in either direction, 
which represents 19,200 
journeys in either direction per 
year (4 days times 30 weeks). 
Therefore, in the end, with a 
generic operating cost of €100/
hour, it may be estimated that 
for this section on a standard 
weekday, the remote controlled 
traffic light system allows a 
theoretical savings of €80,000.b 
This applies to one line only 
and on certain days only. The 
equipment for a small 
crossroads (replacement of 
traffic controllers, etc.) costs 
about €20,000. For an 
equipped crossroads, the 
reprogramming of traffic light 
grids costs between €15,000 
and €30,000. In comparison, 
STIB estimates that a separate 
bus lane costs between 1 and 
1.5 million euros per kilometre 
and that a separate tram lane 
costs between 10 and 15 
million euros per kilometre 
[TRITEL, 2014]. It is not 
pertinent, however, to place 
physical developments and 
remote controlled traffic lights 
in opposition. Due to traffic 
congestion, the optimum use 
of remote controlled traffic 
lights is often accompanied by 
the development or 
redevelopment of roads or 
crossroads, as they are less 
efficient in unprotected 
sections.
a Taking	 into	 consideration	 the	 hourly	
differentiation	 of	 time	 saved	 and	 the	
daily	distribution	of	journeys.
b Based	 on	 the	 internal	 document:	
“Eva luat ion	 l i gne	 95	 :	 Impact	
télécommande	des	feux”	[Henry,	2011].
Figure 2. Advantages of active management of remote controlled traffic lights. Source: Thomas Ermans, 
USL-B – CES, based on Furth and Muller [2000] and interviews with STIB and BM (2014).
2. Implementation of the tool
13. Through their management contract (2007-2011), the Region and 
STIB  had set the objective to equip 150 crossroads by 2008. This 
objective has  since been increased through the new management 
contract (2013-2017), with plans to equip 450 crossroads in the BCR 
territory by 2015. However, at the end of 2014, only 150 crossroads 
were equipped and 24 were still under study. The main lines  which are 
equipped today are the CHRONO lines  (trams 3, 4 and 7), tram lines  25 
and 94, and bus lines 49, 71 and 95.
14. Several elements allow us to understand this delay in the 
implementation of the extension project for remote controlled traffic 
lights.
2.1. Technical challenges and physical developments
15. At the beginning of the project, the regional stakeholders had to 
face several technical challenges specific to the tool (determination of 
the transmission distances for the vehicles  and revision of the traffic 
light grids) and modernise the existing material when necessary (traffic 
controllers  which were too old or incompatible with MS12). For the 
most part, these challenges have been overcome, yet there are still 
some failures from time to time.
16. Furthermore, the efficiency of the remote controlled traffic light 
system is  highly dependent on the exactness  of the theoretical arrival 
times at the crossroads. When there is  not enough protection from car 
traffic, these times  soon become too random and the system may even 
5
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Figure 3. Crossroads in Brussels equipped with remote controlled traffic lights in 2016. Source: Bruxelles 
Mobilité and STIB, 2016 – Author: Thomas Ermans, USL-B – CES.
2011 2012 2013 2014
Number of crossroads equipped 
on bus and tram lines
63 100 120 150
Table 1. Evolution of the number of crossroads equipped on bus and tram 
lines. Source: BCR parliament, 2013a, 2014.
prove to be counterproductive, to the point that at certain equipped 
crossroads, the system simply does not work. Separate lanes  therefore 
constitute the ultimate complementary development for efficient remote 
controlled traffic lights, which in turn maximise their effect on regularity 
and journey time. However, overall, the configuration of on-board 
transmitters  and traffic controllers  is  very sensitive to variations  in car 
traffic and continues to require many adjustments, which delay the 
implementation of the system.
17. An additional factor in the lack of precision with respect to arrival 
times at crossroads  is  the position of stops. The theoretical duration of 
each stop is  estimated at 20 seconds. When the stops  are positioned 
at the beginning of a  journey, the variability in their duration – which 
depends  mainly on passengers  getting on and off of the vehicles – is 
carried forward to the arrival time. In the case of a longer stop, the 
vehicle may miss  its  green phase at the crossroads. In order to reduce 
the impact of this uncertainty on system operation as  much as 
possible, STIB  therefore recommends  positioning the stops  after the 
crossroads as soon as possible.
18. Finally, the length of time for pedestrians  to cross the road – which 
determines  the minimum length of the traffic light cycle (at a speed of 1 
metre per second), has  an impact on the likelihood of a  green light for 
an approaching vehicle. The shorter the crossing time, the greater the 
flexibility of cycles  and, at the same time, the greater the likelihood that 
a public transport vehicle will go through quickly on a green light. A 
possible solution  would be the development of “pedestrian islands” 
positioned at the centre of the road for particularly long crossings, 
which allows the safety time to be split. 
19. Nevertheless, without a drastic reduction in car traffic, the 
solutions to the relative inefficiency of the remote controlled traffic light 
system depend on the redevelopment of the public space, which, 
inevitably, is a long and costly process. 
2.2. Coordination with the municipalities: between facilitation 
and opposition
20. Several of STIB's  strategic lines  go through municipal crossroads. 
In order for the traffic lights  at these crossroads  to be equipped with the 
MS12 system, the Region proposes  to conclude a takeover agreement 
with the municipalities  for these traffic lights. Several municipalities  – 
which are often limited in terms  of budget, lack technical abilities and 
do not see a direct strategic stake – accept the takeover conventions, 
with some of them even seeing the opportunity to modernise 
sometimes  dilapidated installations  on their territory under the 
responsibility of the Region. Eight municipalities have so far accepted 
the takeover of one or more of their crossroads.5 
21. A widely known exception with respect to the participation of the 
municipalities  in the regional project involves the municipality of 
Brussels-City. This is  the only municipality which manages  a  large 
number of strategic crossroads  for the public transport network which 
has  also equipped itself with a  crossroads management service. 
Bruxelles  Mobilité has  sent – to no avail – takeover agreements for 
about thirty crossroads, and the repeated attempts  to meet with the 
body or the deputy mayors concerned have not been successful.6 The 
municipality has  stated its opposition in principle to remote controlled 
traffic lights, in particular inside the Pentagon area, where many 
articulated buses roam through the narrow streets. Among the main 
reasons mentioned by the City is the concern that the system would 
have too much of an impact on the other modes, in particular car 
traffic. If the system is  applied to many crossroads, the City of Brussels 
would have to deal with the complaints  of users, and appears  to prefer 
a certain autonomy in this matter. Furthermore, Bruxelles  Mobilité is 
waiting for the evaluation of the new traffic plan accompanying the 
pedestrianisation of the centre, which will determine the role of public 
transport in the centre of Brussels. 
6
5  This includes the municipalities of Anderlecht, Ixelles, Evere, Ganshoren, Molenbeek-Saint-Jean, Schaerbeek, Uccle and Watermael-Boitsfort. Negotiations are under way with the 
municipalities of Jette, Forest, Woluwe-Saint-Pierre, Woluwe-Saint-Lambert and Brussels-City [BCR parliament, 2015].
6 Based on our interview at Bruxelles Mobilité, 2014.
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2.3. Limited but strategic human resources
22. Another factor in the delay of the operationalisation of the project 
is  the significant lack of human resources in the regional administration. 
Until 2011, the there were only two people at Bruxelles  Mobilité working 
on this very ambitious  project. For a long time, this lack of human 
resources limited the development of the project to the maintenance 
and adaptation of traffic controllers  to the MS12 system, rather than 
equipping new crossroads. STIB  as well as  the regional administration 
questioned the policymakers  on several occasions, requesting 
additional staff as  quickly as  possible. In 2012, two more people were 
hired, but one of them was  reassigned to other tasks  in March 20147. 
This  recurring lack of human resources  also calls  into question the 
political will to give priority to this project.
3. Management of priorities
23. Let us  look at how the traffic light phases  are determined, i.e. how 
the priorities  and the green phase of each mode are determined and 
who decides. As we shall see, the management of remote controlled 
traffic lights is often the result of a  compromise rather than a  choice 
based only on technical imperatives.
3.1. An iterative working procedure in the process of 
internalisation
24. Five stakeholders are involved in the implementation of remote 
controlled traffic lights: Bruxelles  Mobilité, STIB and three 
sub-contractors. The municipalities, the police and other STIB  and 
Bruxelles  Mobilité services  (mainly concerning development, stops  and 
transfers) have also been involved periodically.
25. The implementation of remote controlled traffic lights  intervenes  in 
two cases: either it is integrated into the redevelopment planned for a 
crossroads involving strategic lines of public transport, or the 
crossroads  are analysed according to priority lines determined by STIB. 
The latter case occurs most frequently, at the request of STIB. 
Equipping and programming therefore take place according to sections 
of lines, i.e. a series  of several successive crossroads  on a line. On the 
one hand, this  allows the benefits of remote controlled traffic lights to 
be maximised and, on the other hand, it allows a rapid measurement of 
its  effects in terms  of regularity and commercial speed. In concrete 
terms, most often, when there has  been a decision to equip a section 
or to adapt a  traffic light grid (following specific requests  from users or a 
municipality, traffic jams  at crossroads, etc.), several discussions 
between the sub-contractor, STIB  and Bruxelles Mobilité are necessary 
before the approval and follow-up of the application of final grids and 
priority matrices by Bruxelles Mobilité. As  we shall see below, the 
strategic decisions are negotiated during these discussions.
26. Faced with the cumbersome nature of this  working procedure, it is 
important to underline the action of the Brussels administration in terms 
of making the working process  lighter in order to speed up the 
implementation of remote controlled traffic lights. Externalisation (i.e. 
the use of private sub-contractors) – which seemed to be an obvious 
fact at the beginning of the project – was gradually questioned in favour 
of greater control of operationalisation by the internal services of the 
administration. Since 2014, Bruxelles Mobilité has created its  traffic light 
grids and priority matrices without the use of sub-contractors. 
27. The major component of this  internalisation could be the 
acquisition and recent implementation (January 2014) by Bruxelles 
Mobilité of a  new remote monitoring and management station for traffic 
controllers 8, with the objective to have a global view in real time of the 
maps of traffic lights  at each crossroads, to be able to diagnose 
7
7 Based on our interview at Bruxelles Mobilité, 2014.
8  As the former station was technically obsolete (the updating of traffic controllers and the management of dysfunctions had to take place on the premises), Bruxelles Mobilité issued a 
public invitation to tender in 2011, in order to acquire a new remote monitoring and management station for traffic controllers for all crossroads. Siemens SA was awarded the contract. 
The station was delivered to the administration in January 2014, for a final budget of approximately 3 million euros.
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dysfunctions, to facilitate data gathering at counting stations and to 
intervene directly in the programming of crossroads via centralised 
management [Bruxelles  Mobilité, 2012b]. As regards remote controlled 
traffic lights, the station also allows the traffic light grids  and matrices  of 
the different traffic controllers to be imported or modified directly. 
3.2. Maximum priority “within the limits of what is acceptable”
28. The balance between the phases  of the different modes  is 
conditioned by safety (minimum time for pedestrians  to cross), physical 
development and the density of traffic. Complaints  and field 
observations  (formation of queues  or traffic jams at crossroads, 
technical faults, etc.) also refine the different proposed scenarios. 
During working meetings, each participant presents  its  objectives. STIB 
of course wishes to see the maximum level of priority granted to its 
vehicles, if  only to respect the commitments  of its management 
contract, but it does not want to see crossroads  blocked by traffic jams 
and is  well aware of the difficulties  of the operationalisation of remote 
controlled traffic lights.
29. Furthermore, politicians  are asking for priority for public transport 
“within the limits  of what is  acceptable”: “In this  case as well, the 
constant search for a compromise between the needs of public 
transport and those of the other users  must be underlined” (words  of 
the former Brussels  Transport Minister, Brigitte Grouwels, Infrastructure 
Commission, 12/10/2011).9  Therefore, in the eyes of regional 
representatives, remote controlled traffic lights  cannot represent a point 
of contention and must constantly lead to a compromise with respect 
to the physical and temporal sharing of space. The priority given to 
public transport is  a relative – and not total – priority. It is an explicit 
political choice. Brigitte Grouwels  explains  that “the system of remote 
controlled traffic lights  functions  according to the principle of “maximum 
priority”, and not absolute priority. During the design of traffic light 
plans, certain limits  have been imposed on the system: no traffic light 
cycle longer than 120 seconds  and no blocking of successive 
crossroads.” [BCR parliament, 2010]. The “relative” and “total” priorities 
in the interpretation grid by Furth and Muller [Furth and Muller, 2000] 
are mentioned here respectively, in less neutral terms, through the 
notions of “maximum” and “absolute” priorities.
30. An element which explains this  positioning is  that the only directly 
visible impact of the system is perceived in a  negative way. The users  of 
public transport who gain 1 or 2 minutes with respect to their usual 
journey time are not likely to notice it (they will perhaps notice an 
improvement in punctuality, following the increase in regularity as a 
result of the installation of remote controlled traffic lights), but the 
formation of queues of motorists and the doubling of waiting times  at 
crossroads  for certain lanes  are much more noticeable effects. 
Politicians  have therefore opted for a compromise in the actual choice 
of the system: promote public transport without penalising the other 
modes  (especially cars), while ensuring substantial reductions  in 
operating costs, with respect to other solutions such as  the use of 
separate lanes for public transport, for example. Dobruszkes  and 
Fourneau have made the observation that “it is the culture of 
compromise which prevails, and the improvement of the efficiency of 
public transport may generally only be considered without getting in the 
way of car traffic” [Dobruszkes and Fourneau, 2007].
3.3. Room for manoeuvre of the administration
31. The Brussels  administration is therefore caught between two traffic 
lights, so to speak: give priority to public transport and keep the 
motorists, pedestrians  and cyclists  happy. It attempts  to allow an 
acceptable rate of green for all modes  but points  out that “we cannot fit 
two litres in a one-litre bottle”.10 For the administration, any traffic light 
plan is a compromise whereby there is an attempt to allow the 
maximum number of seconds  for trams and buses, unless  they 
8
9 BCR parliament, 2011. 
10 Based on our interview at Bruxelles Mobilité, 2013.
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completely block a crossroads, but this  decision is  not supported by 
politicians. 
32. Consequently, it is above all the small crossroads which are 
equipped and operational, and few of the strategic crossroads. Of the 
60 crossroads considered as  strategic by Bruxelles Mobilité, 20 were 
equipped with remote controlled traffic lights  in 2014.11 The challenge is 
all the more significant since it is  precisely at these major crossroads 
that STIB  vehicles  waste the most time. These crossroads are more 
difficult to equip than the small crossroads, mainly due to their 
importance in terms of car traffic.
33. This  is  why, in order to ensure the efficiency of the system “within 
the limits  of what is  acceptable”, Bruxelles Mobilité leaves itself a lot of 
room for manoeuvre with respect to instructions. While the framework 
of “what is acceptable” seems  well-defined (and even too well), the 
compromise between modes  in the traffic light grids and priority 
matrices  (i.e. deciding to add a few seconds  of green for a mode) is 
established by Bruxelles Mobilité together with STIB, and through the 
mobilisation of strong expertise in the field (counting, complaints, 
observations, simulation, etc.). 
34. The instructions  in programme documents, i.e. Plan Iris  2 and the 
management contract, are sometimes contradictory and cannot be 
applied to the letter. For example, it is  impossible to favour both green 
waves for cars  (static system, calibrated according to the speed of 
cars, independently of the remote controlled traffic light system) and the 
flow of public transport at crossroads  (dynamic system which takes all 
modes  into account while favouring public transport), and it is 
impossible to reduce the waiting time of pedestrians and increase their 
green phase (at a  crossroads  with at least two directions, what is  given 
to one is taken away from the other). 
35. Furthermore, certain programme restrictions  are simply 
inapplicable. The stakeholders underline that, in the field, the effect of 
remote controlled traffic lights  can never be entirely neutral with respect 
to the flow, especially when it is  combined with the evolution of road 
capacity (one less traffic lane, widening of pavements, development of 
separate lanes). It is  therefore difficult to guarantee a theoretical rate of 
green of 100%  for public transport without reducing the capacity of 
roads to just over 80% at least sometimes, for the crossroads  not 
considered as strategic by Bruxelles  Mobilité, which goes  against Plan 
IRIS 2. This is  especially true given that all crossroads  are different and 
the instructions are difficult to apply to all of them. 
36. This  lack of clarity in the guidelines  means that those in charge of 
remote controlled traffic lights at Bruxelles Mobilité, through their daily 
decisions  to give or take away a few seconds to or from a mode of 
transportation, make important strategic choices. In short, contrary to 
the passive and purely executive role imagined overall, the Brussels 
administration has  shown a  certain strategic ingenuity [Tellier, 2012], by 
striving to bypass  the abundance of rules  (sometimes contradictory) to 
establish a compromise between stakeholders  (and modes), even if it 
leads  to sub-optimal technical and economic performance (according 
to the objectives  of the project). This  ingenuity allows it to ensure that 
the project does  not find itself at a standstill due to contradictions in 
programme and political guidelines, i.e. to avoid bureaucratic 
dysfunction, as  described by Michel Crozier (tendency towards 
regulatory inflation which most often leads  to inertia in the system, see 
Crozier [1963]). Above all, this  compromise allows the tool to be 
adapted to (or accepted by) the Brussels  “ecosystem”, so that the 
project functions  no matter what, without the wish for a split on the part 
of the administration, in order for it to receive continued political 
support. 
37. But the absence of a split does  not necessarily mean that there is 
an absence of ambition. It is  interesting to note that the new 
specifications [Bruxelles  Mobilité, 2015] for the development of 150 
crossroads, published in 2015, proposes the possibility to interrupt the 
main direction when a public transport vehicle arrives at a crossroads 
(i.e. total priority), although this  possibility does not yet apply. 
Furthermore, could the creation of a new remote monitoring and 
management station for traffic controllers constitute the premises  of a 
9
11 Based on our interview at Bruxelles Mobilité, 2014.
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true global tool for traffic regulation (for example, to control the capacity 
of entry roads  into Brussels)? This  is  why the remote controlled traffic 
lights  project may be perceived as a process aimed at laying the 
technical foundations  for a future possibility [Zitouni and Tellier, 2013], 
even if it is currently not envisaged as such.
Conclusion 
38. In Brussels, remote controlled traffic lights  were designed as a 
technical tool allowing the constant erosion of the commercial speed to 
be halted, and to cut back on operational costs. Actual savings  are 
observed for certain lines which are relatively well protected (trams 3, 4, 
7, 25). But the system is  ineffective for others (line 71). Its  lack of 
efficiency as  a global solution and the accumulated delays  with respect 
to objectives and deadlines  stand out, which may be explained in 
various ways. 
39. An initial interpretation concerns  the problem of car traffic. The 
high level of traffic congestion and its  variation in time due to the 
uncertainty it causes with respect to the arrival time of priority vehicles, 
remains  a  vector of inefficiency of the system. The measures in the 
framework of the AVANTI programme aim at reducing the influence of 
car traffic on public transport based on the separation of modes, which 
gives particular focus to infrastructures, especially through the creation 
of separate lanes. While remote controlled traffic lights  are intended to 
be a global facilitator of public transport traffic in the Brussels  Region 
(the management contract provides for almost all traffic lights  in the 
Region to be equipped and therefore, in the end, operational), and not 
only on STIB CHRONO lines, is  it necessary for the entire network to 
use separate lanes in order to guarantee the smooth operation of the 
system? Even if it was conceivable, there are many examples  to show 
that the congestion of the surface road network sometimes reaches 
levels  which make the use of system counterproductive, even with 
separate lanes. The aim to reduce car traffic overall therefore proves  to 
be absolutely necessary.
40. A second interpretation of the difficulty to implement the MS12 
system lies  in the fact that initially, in the calculation of deadlines, there 
was  no consideration of the negotiation time necessary to settle 
inevitable friction caused by the project within the Brussels  “ecosystem” 
(made up of stakeholders  and their own rules) as  it developed, due to 
the strategic and political importance it takes  on. This  absence is 
echoed in the concept of the “ballistic pathology of innovation” 
developed by Bruno Latour [2003], which is characterised by the belief 
in the self-fulfilling capacity of technical tools  and suggests  that once 
the technical principles  are defined, the rest is merely application. In the 
case of the remote controlled traffic lights  project, the system was 
presented [see in particular STIB, 2003] as  an innovative technical 
device which reconciled high commercial speed for public transport 
and improvement of car traffic flow. A “win-win” solution, thanks to 
technology. In practice, the technical challenges  were resolved relatively 
quickly, but as  soon as  the implementation involves  a more direct 
interaction with the Brussels  “ecosystem”, it becomes  more laborious 
as friction is felt. 
41. This  friction appears  essentially at three levels. Firstly, each 
redevelopment of the public space in the framework of AVANTI is the 
object of many negotiations  which take place as part of procedures  to 
obtain the necessary permits, which has  the effect of postponing the 
programming of traffic lights. Secondly, the takeover by the Region of 
the management of certain traffic lights managed by the municipalities 
is  similar to the transfer of a  sensitive lever for action with respect to the 
use of public space, and continues, as  such, to lead to negotiations. 
Thirdly, while MS12 has  been fulfilled as  regards its  technical 
operationalisation, the programming of traffic light phases – the heart of 
the arbitration between modes  of travel within the remote controlled 
traffic light system – must be discussed case by case and crossroads 
by crossroads, between STIB  and the Region, and even with certain 
municipalities.
42. From this  point of view, the analysis underlines the role of the 
administration in the creation of a compromise so that the “remote 
controlled traffic lights” technical tool is  able to function. However, the 
proven search for a compromise between the users  of the public space 
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favours solutions  other than the technical and economic optimum, and 
the effectiveness  of the system still seems  to be greatly determined by 
the preservation of the capacity for cars  on the roads. The 
administration respects  the guidelines  established at political level 
which, by advocating a remote controlled traffic light system “in the 
limits  of what is acceptable” promotes  public transport without being 
against the use of cars.12
43. At the heart of all of these discussions is  the question of the 
respective role of public transport and cars  in the framework of a very 
high level of road congestion. The challenge is  great, as the influence of 
car traffic in Brussels  is  such that it forces  STIB  to own a fleet of trams 
and buses which is greater than necessary to ensure the frequencies 
required by the demand [Dobruszkes and Fourneau, 2007]. 
44. As is, the tool therefore appears  to contribute more to a process 
of “small steps” towards  resolving the still urgent problem of mobility in 
Brussels. In this respect, the process  may be seen as  a continuous 
delay in taking clear political decisions [Barthe, 2009], and even a  lack 
of regional ambition [Doucet, 2007] in this  matter. Remote controlled 
traffic lights in Brussels  would certainly benefit from more clarity with 
respect to objectives  and from a clear political commitment in favour of 
reducing the influence of cars in the public space, with “true” priority 
given to public transport. 
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